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FAMILY INHERITANCE PROVISIONS IN
THE BARBADOS SUCCESSION ACT
REDEFINING "THE FAMILY"
NORMA MONICA FORDE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Departing from the established principle that the testator is entitled
to determine personally the destiny of his property,' the Barbados Suc-
cession Act2 provides that a testator's spouse has a legal right to a portion
of the testator's estate. This right is to have priority over "devises, be-
quests and shares on intestacy.' 3 The common law had long ago afforded
a widow the right of dower, which attached to any land of her husband.
This right could not be defeated by any disposition by the husband inter
vivos or by will. 4 It was legislation, in Barbados the Dower Act of 1878,5
which strengthened the husband's freedom of testamentary disposition by
enabling him to deprive his wife of her right to dower either through
express declaration in his will or through any duly executed deed.6 The
family inheritance provisions of the Succession Act of 1975 may be
regarded in part as a legislative revival of the old common law right of
the wife to a share in her deceased husband's estate. The Succession Act,
by careful definition of "spouse," has sought to protect succession rights
of the husband and wife, as well as the partners to a common law union.
In addition, the Succession Act has provided procedures through which
disinherited children are brought within the ambit of the court's dis-
cretion. Moreover, the Succession Act has expanded the definition of
"dependent," limited by tradition in other statutes to mean only the
"legitimate" family, to include the "illegitimate" family as well.
7
Therefore, the most innovative aspect of the Barbados legislation
must be the interpretation given the words dependant, spouse, and child,
which for the purposes of this statute widens the definition to embrace
the "illegitimate family."'
*LL.B., LL.M. (U.W.L); Lecturer of Law, University of the West Indies.
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II. INTERPRETATION
The Succession Act provides that reference to a "child" or "issue"
of a deceased person shall include a child with respect to whom an
adoption order has been made under the Adoption Act. In this respect,
the Succession Act merely affirms the status of the adopted child secured
by previous legislation.' The Succession Act also defines "child" or "issue"
to include an illegitimate child of a deceased person if:
(i) that person has been adjudged by the court or a Magistrate's
Court to be the father or putative father, or
(ii) that person has acknowledged himself to be the father
under Section 8 (6) of the Registration Act, or
(iii) that person has by an affidavit sworn before a Justice of
the Peace or a Notary Public, or by other document duly
attested and sealed, together with a declaration by the mother
of the child contained in the same instrument confirming that
that person is the father of the child, admitted paternity, but such
affidavit or other document shall be of no effect unless it has
been recorded in the Registration Office.10
The illegitimate child must clearly demonstrate that he is the child
of his father and will only be so accepted legally if there has been formal
recognition and registration. Evidently these rigid rules signify a legisla-
tive attempt to deal with the problem of identification. Bromley, in his
comment on sections 14 and 15 of the English Family Law Reform Act,1"
points to difficulties which may arise concerning an acceptable method
of establishing the relationship of the claimant to the deceased when a
statute does not provide clear direction.12 Thus, the need for some un-
mistakable means whereby paternity can be formally acknowledged is
not in dispute.
However, to establish paternity, the Barbados legislation has con-
formed to the usual pattern followed by other statutes designed to assist
illegitimates. It is the mother or father who must institute proceedings to
provide the required evidence of paternity. If no affiliation order has
been made by the court, a proceeding must be initiated by the mother.
If the father's name is not included through registration on the birth
certificate, the only remaining choice is a complicated procedure re-
quiring declarations from the father and mother, which must then be
followed by registration. The illegitimate child is not permitted to institute
such proceedings on his own behalf.I3
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The limitations placed on the proof of paternity in the Barbados legis.
lation, when considered together with the section of the Succession Act 14
which gives the child of a testator the right to apply for some benefit from
the testator's estate, could lead to the conclusion that the approach to
reform in this area is rather moderate, especially when the result depends
on the discretion of the court.
The Succession Act stipulates the definition of spouse which is to
be used for purposes of inheritance rights. According to the Succession
Act, the term spouse includes "a single woman who was living together
with a single man as his wife for a period of not less than seven years
immediately preceding the date of his death" and a single man in the
same situation." In the interest of certainty, subsection (5) stipulates
that only one such relationship shall be considered for the purposes of
benefit. By extending the definition of spouse to include the common law
relationship of a woman and man, the legislation may be a first step
towards giving legal recognition to common law unions.16 The legisla-
tion's insistence on an uninterrupted seven year period of consensual
cohabitation seems to indicate the statute is intended to secure inheritance
rights for persons involved in a reasonably stable relationship. 17
In order to avoid ambiguity or uncertainty in the distribution of
property on intestacy, the Succession Act also defines words such as
brother, sister, and father. Section 48 deals explicitly with these, defining
brother or sister in relation to an intestate to include any child of the
father or mother of the intestate.11 The interpretation of the term father,
not unnaturally, reflects the earlier problems relating to identification of
illegitimate child."9 However, as a result of these provisions, the recog-
nised father of an illegitimate child, 20 together with the mother,2 can
share or wholly succeed to that child's estate on that child's intestacy.
Moreover, where there is no surviving spouse or mother or father at the
death of an intestate, his legitimate and illegitimate brothers and sisters
will share his estate equally.22
The introduction of another claimant, the "dependant," for the pur-
poses of intestate succession might be viewed as a mitigation of the seven
year restriction placed on common law unions or as an extension to it.
Dependant, for the purposes of application for maintenance out of an
intestate's estate, means "any woman (other than his spouse) living to-
gether with a man as his wife immediately preceding the date of his
death and wholly or mainly maintained by him at this time . . .,,23 The
dependant classification also includes an illegitimate child who does not
satisfy the previously discussed requirements for illegitimacy. It en-
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compasses an illegitimate child of the deceased person who is under the
age of eighteen or who, due to mental or physical disability, is incapable
of maintaining himself. However, the illegitimate child who wishes to
make application as a dependant of the deceased person must have been
wholly or mainly maintained by him at the date of his death.
24
In considering an application, the court is authorized to direct in-
quiries into the authenticity of the dependant's claim. The court's dis-
cretion to initiate inquiries includes the right to examine the conduct of
the person by or on whose behalf the application for maintenance is made,
or of any other person and any other matter which in the circumstances
the court considers relevant.25 Thus, before an order is granted for main-
tenance out of the intestate's estate in favour of a dependant, provision is
made for a conclusive check of the dependant's right to make such a
claim and his need for maintenance.
A maintenance order may be made for periodic or lump sum pay-
ments, but where the award is for periodic payments, these must cease
when the woman or man enters another common law union or dies. In the
case of a dependant who is an illegitimate child, periodic payments are
terminated on the attainment of majority, the end of the disability if such
is the basis of the claim, or death.2 6 The limitation period within which
applications must be made is "twelve months from the first taking out of
the representation of the intestate's estate."
'27
The statute is less restrictive in its identification of a dependant than
it is of a spouse or a child. But when it is recalled that the dependant's
claim is to maintenance out of the estate of an intestate, while the spouse
and child may succeed to the whole of the intestate's estate, and further
that the spouse may be entitled to a share in a testator's property as a
legal right, the distinction may be justified. There is still the probability
of a situation where a spouse, after six years consensual cohabitation, is
replaced by another who, because of the provision requiring maintenance
to be provided wholly or mainly by the testator at the time of his death,
may benefit after a short relationship with the intestate whereas the
common law partner for six years is precluded from making any applica-
tion to the court.
III. LEGAL RIGHTS OF TESTATOR'S SPOUSE AND CHILDREN
Part X of the Succession Act details the assistance which the legisla-
tion affords a testator's spouse and children who are deemed competent
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to be granted a share of the testator's estate. The testator must have been
domiciled in Barbados at his death. The precise portion of the property to
which a spouse is entitled as a legal right is stipulated. If a testator dies
and leaves a spouse and a child who is capable of making a claim accord-
ing to the statute, the spouse shall have a right to one-quarter of the
estate. Where there is no such child the spouse takes one-half of the
estate. Where a devise or bequest is expressed in a will to be in addition
to the spouse's share as a legal right, the testator's intention is construed
to entitle the spouse to both the gift by the will and the share as a legal
right. In any other case a gift by will is deemed to be in satisfaction of
the share as a legal right. The spouse is allowed a six month period from
the time the will is admitted to probate to decide whether to accept the
devise or bequest, or the share as a legal right. 2 A spouse who fails to
exercise this option, according to the Succession Act, "shall be entitled
under the will and shall not be entitled to take any share as a legal
right."29 A similar election is provided for a spouse where a person dies
partly testate and partly intestate.30
The testator who has made during his lifetime what the Succession
Act terms "permanent provision for his spouse whether under contract or
otherwise"31 is less likely to -have his testamentary disposition altered if
he has by such disposition disinherited his spouse. The Succession Act
permits property which has been the subject matter of such provision,
periodic payments excepted, to be regarded as property given in whole
or partial satisfaction of the spouse's share as a legal right.32 The same
section allows for the necessary readjustment between the value of the
property transferred to the spouse during the testator's lifetime, and the
statutory legal right.13
With respect to the children of a testator, no statutory legal right has
been established. The court may order that some provision be made for
a child who is a minor or who is physically or mentally incapable of
maintaining himself. Application for maintenance may be made by the
child or on his behalf. The court is authorised to order periodic payments
or may, within its discretionary power, award a lump sum payment.34
Thus, emphasis appears to be on the rights of the spouse rather than
on making provision for the children of the testator. The assumption could
be that a testator is more likely to disinherit his spouse than his children,
and therefore, the legislation must seek to afford greater protection for
the interests of the spouse. The Irish Succession Act allows the court, after
taking into account all the Circumstances, to make an order for the main-
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tenance of the child of a testator if in the court's opinion "the testator has
failed in his moral duty to make proper provision for the child in accord-
ance with his means whether by will or otherwise." 35 Since the measure
of responsibility is the testator's moral duty towards -he child, the Irish
Court has discretion which may be exercised in favour of the child. The
postulate may be that the corresponding provisions of the Barbados legis-
lation, which contains minority and disability requirements, may embody
the kind of inflexibility which precludes any decision based on moral
duty. The principle of freedom of testamentary disposition has little appeal
to the radical reformer who is more eager to weigh the testator's rights
against the burden of state responsibility.
IV. DISTRIBUTION ON INTESTACY
Before November 1975, the effective date of the Succession Act,
distribution of an intestate's estate was governed by the old common law
canons of descent 3" as amended by the Inheritance Act and the Intestate's
Estates Act. 37 Part VI of the Succession Act now clearly delineates the
order of precedence for spouse, child, issue, mother and father, brothers
and sisters, and the children of brothers and sisters. If an intestate's sur.
viving spouse takes the whole estate, there is no issue or next-of-kin. Where
there is one child or next-of-kin the spouse's share of the estate is reduced
to two-thirds. The child takes the remaining one-third, or in the case of
next-of-kin they share the remaining one-third equally. Where the in-
testate's survivors comprise a spouse and more than one child, the method
of apportionment is reversed, the spouse takes one-third leaving two.thirds
to be divided equally among the children. A provision for inheritance
where the intestate dies leaving issue and no spouse is also distinctly
specified. If all the issue are in equal degree of relationship to the deceased
person, distribution is to be in equal shares among them, and if they are
not, distribution must be "per stirpes.1 3
s
The Succession Act also details succession rights of other surviving
relatives of an intestate,1 9 and specifies the conditions under which an
estate will vest in the Crown as "bona vacantia. 140 The Minister responsible
for legal affairs in his discretion may waive "in whole or in part the
Crown's right in favour of such persons and on such terms as he thinks
proper having regard to all the circumstances of the case."'41
By determining the disposition of the decedent's estate on intestacy
this part of the Succession Act may be regarded as being beneficially
BARBADOS SUCCESSION ACT
reformative. The staiutory definitions of spouse, child, and dependant
result in a more realistic division of an intestate's estate, although again
the spouse's right appears to have been the major consideration. 42
V. EXCLUSION FROM SUCCESSION AND DISINHERITANCE
The matter of the spouse's "unworthiness to succeed" 43 is the main
concern in Part XI of the Succession Act. Other succession statutes, such
as English and Trinidad inheritance family legislation,4 4 have adopted the
test of reasonableness. This test, applicable only where reasonable provision
was neither made in the decedent's will nor implied by the law of intestacy,
requires that the courts be satisfied that it would have been reasonable
for the decedent to make provision for the dependant. The court must con-
sider the conduct of the spouse in relation to the decedent and the
testator's reasons, so far as ascertainable, for failing to make any provision
for the dependant. Moreover, the courts cannot assume that the law
relating to intestacy necessarily makes reasonable provisions in all cases. 45
The courts may require evidential support of the disposition, such as a
signed statement left by a testator.4 6
The Barbados Act, unlike the English and Trinidad succession stat-
utes, specifies the conditions which will exclude a spouse from succession
and disinheritance.
(1) A spouse against whom the deceased obtained a judicial
separation, a spouse who failed to comply with a decree of restitution
of conjugal rights obtained by the deceased, and a spouse guilty of
desertion which has continued up to the death for three years or more
shall be precluded from taking any share in the estate of the deceased
as a legal right on intestacy.
(2) A spouse who was guilty of conduct which justified the
deceased in separating and living apart from him shall be deemed
to be guilty of desertion within the meaning of sub-section(1) .4
Thus, the Barbados court, in examining the exclusion of the spouse
in the testamentary disposition of property, lacks the broad discretion of
the Trinidad and English courts to consider moral claims, responsibilities,
and subjective or objective tests of reasonableness.
These provisions of the Barbados Act seem to be too heavily based
on the old concept of matrimonial fault during a period when the trend
is to place more emphasis on economic need. Subsection (3) precludes a
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person found guilty of any offense against the decedent punishable by
imprisonment for a period of at least two years from taking any share in
the decedent's estate as a legal right or even from making an application
to the court on behalf of a child of a testator. In this manner, the Barbados
Succession Act introduces the concept of criminal fault in determining
inheritance rights.
In subsection (4), however, the element of fault does not predominate
and the term "husband and wife" replaces the term "spouse."
Where a husband and wife have ceased to cohabit with each
other and have been living apart continuously for a period of
seven years or more immediately preceding the date of death of
either of them, the survivor shall be precluded from taking
any share in the estate of the deceased as a legal right or on
intestacy.4"
The reason for distinguishing between a spouse, and a husband and
wife in subsection (4) seems unnecessary since only a spouse could be
guilty of the matrimonial offences listed in subsections (1) and (2). Per-
haps the intention is to deal with a situation where there is separation
without commission of a recognised matrimonial offence. Whatever is
intended, the result must be the disentitlement of the "innocent" as well
as the "guilty" spouse provided that the "magic period of seven years" 9
has worked its alchemy to transform a wife or husband into a person with
no right to a claim of succession or inheritance.
Section 103 provides the necessary safeguards against disposition of
property before death which would defeat the rights or claims of the
surviving spouse and children. If the court is convinced that a disposition
of property within three years before death was made with the object of
defeating the statutory rights of the spouse and children, the court may
order that such a disposition be deemed a gift made by will and to form
part of the decedent's estate and to have no other effect. A disposition in
this section includes a "donatio mortis causa." 50
V. CONCLUSION
Altogether, the Succession Act has significantly altered the law relat-
ing to succession and inheritance in Barbados. The serious attempt to align
legislative development with social reality is commendable. However, in
some areas, especially those concerned with the rights of the child, the
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Succession Act has failed to be sufficiently inventive. 5' The difficulty of
legislating for every eventuality in view of the existing variations in family
relationships is recognised. Undoubtedly, morality and "opening the flood
gates" arguments influenced the legislators when they drafted the Succes-
sion Act. However, this is only the principal act, and amendment to it is
not prohibited.
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